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UNITED OR DIVIDED TWINS? 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BERINGIA 
The modernization experience in Alaska might help in setting an 
economic roadmap for Alaska's western neighbor, the Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug. However, in trying to explain to their Russian 
colleagues the experience of the Alaska model, a pair of Alaska 
economists realized that, despite all the talk about sustainable 
development and the human dimension for arctic science, we do not 
have a generally accepted framework of economic and policy 
analysis for Alaska or the U.S. Arctic. 
e started with a 
working hypothesis 
that the U.S. 
example of 
modernization in the 
Arctic, specifically 
experience in Alaska 
since statehood 
( 1959) and in the 
North Slope 
Borough since its establishment as a self-
rule municipal government (1972), is a 
potential prototype of development for 
other sparsely settled high-latitude regions, 
particularly those populated by disparate 
population groups with primarily 
indigenous and immigrant origins. 
We postulated that the Alaska 
experience incorporates the most 
sophisticated combination of market 
institutions and local and regional self-
governance of any of the sub-national 
regions in the Arctic and Subarctic. One 
indicator of such sophistication is the 
coexistence of high levels of per capita 
income and material welfare originating from 
the extractive activities of large 
multinational firms, with sustained high 
levels of reliance on subsistence resources 
and traditional relationships within Native 
communities. We anticipate that Alaska 
contains or has demonstrated most of the 
elements that we can expect to see in the 
foreseeable development of other post-Soviet 
Arctic regions, including Alaska's nearest 
neighbor Chukotka, one of Russia's poorest 
and least modernized regions. 
When we began to look at Alaska and 
eastern Russia we speculated whether these 
are "new" and "unique" cases within the 
scope of western development economics. 
We are beginning to see that, in so many 
ways, the economies are ordinary and 
simple and do not necessarily create a new 
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paradigm in development economics. 
Specifically, the past and present state of 
the economies of these northern regions are 
consistent with existing explanations for a 
subset of economies that rely heavily on 
export-led growth of primary resource 
production. Several theories relate the 
importance of the growth of the export 
sector of a resource producing country or 
region to the total and sustained growth of 
its economy. One of the first people to 
develop this kind of analysis was the 
economic historian Harold Innis (for the 
first time in 1915), who described 
development in his native Canada in terms 
of the production and export of a principal 
resource, called a "staple". 
The story 
of the Alaska economy 
When the US purchased Alaska from the 
Russians in 1867 it quickly stepped into 
Russia's role in the colonial relationship. 
The US exploited salmon as the primary 
base resource from about 1878. Gold was 
discovered in lode deposits in the 1880s in 
the southeast of Alaska Ouneau and 
Treadwell), about the same time as the Lena 
gold fields of Irkutsk began to step up 
operations. The McCarthy-Kennecott 
copper mine, in operation from 1911 to 
1938, produced ore from 1915 to 1928 at a 
value that exceeded that of gold production. 
World War II brought on "Military 
Alaska" and a sizable influx of military and 
construction personnel to Alaska. For this 
period you can consider 'defense' as Alaska's 
exploitable resource. The resource in this 
case is a strategic location. Alaska's 
geography made it vulnerable to Japan 
during World War II and Alaska was also a 
prime staging area for the US lend-lease 
program to the Soviet Union. During the 
Cold War period 1951 to 1960 US 
government stationed between 34,000 and 
50,000 military personnel in Alaska. 
The transformation from colony to a 
wealthy region occurred because Alaska 
became a state of the United States in 1959, 
entitled to the same rights as the other 48 US 
states. Alaska's uccess is due not only to 
Alaska's association with the US, biggest and 
richest of the democratic apitalist nations, 
but specifically, being an equal member of the 
United States. This equality and what may 
be called a degree of sovereignty immediately 
gave Alaska two immense conomic 
advantages. First, Alaska became a part of the 
US and its laws, customs, monetary system, 
and access to US technology, labor and 
capital. Added to the "instant" opportunities 
by association to the US, Alaska reaped the 
benefits of the relatively extensive rights 
states have within the federal republic. The 
United States developed a complex balance 
between states rights and federalism molded 
by 183 years of experience and a civil war. 
Second, as part of becoming a state the 
federal government gave 104 million acres 
(about a third of the state) outright to the 
State of Alaska, including all resource rights 
to royalties, taxes and other conventional 
means to capture economic rents from 
resource development. Since a non-renewable 
resource, like oil, is a "gift of nature," all of 
the income the exploitation generates is 
economic rent. Alaska's wealth after 
statehood was generated from capturing 
economic rents of an extremely valuable "gift 
of nature." As part of its land grant Alaska 
received the Prudhoe Bay oil field, the largest 
deposit of oil ever found in North America 
( discovered in 1968), which, at its peak, 
produced 20 percent of US total oil 
production. 
Alaska faced the chief issues posed to 
any primary resource exporte'r, namely how 
to manage its state owned resource base. 
Alaska also needed to decide how to manage 
the economic rents from non-renewable 
resource development and the subsequent 
revenue flow which those rents would 
generate. First, Alaska policy makers 
recognized the immense importance of 
natural resources and the likelihood that 
economic rents from resource exploitation 
would be the main source of Alaska's wealth 
in the present and future. In its State 
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article on natural resources, the only state to 
do so. Second, decisions on a strategy 
( quantity and price) at which Alaska sells 
its non-renewable resources to maximize 
benefits, or, for that matter, the rate of 
resource depletion, were deliberately taken 
out of the state's sphere of decision making 
once it leased oil deposits and private oil 
companies began producing oil. The 
infrastructure which was involved in 
bringing Alaska oil to market represented an 
investment of over $10 billion dollars, a 
state of the art 800 mile pipeline that 
stretches from the extreme north, where the 
oil fields are, to the tidewater Port of 
Valdez, Alaska. Although the oil Hawing 
through trans-Alaska pipeline comprises a 
large amount of North American oil 
production, it represents less than three 
percent of world oil production. This is not 
enough to inHuence the world market and 
so Alaska became a price taker. That is, 
unlike Saudi Arabia, Alaska does not control 
a large enough portion of the market that its 
incremental supply affects the total supply. 
The combination of needing a How of 
income to pay off large up-front investment 
and the inability to control oil prices means 
that Alaska is committed to a maximum rate 
of depletion (quantity) at whatever price 
the market offers. 
Alaska is a resource owner and also is a 
"sovereign" government hat has taxation 
rights. Because of these two different roles, 
Alaska approaches the task of capturing 
revenues using two philosophically different, 
though non-competing methods. The system 
is somewhat complicated. As the resource 
owner, Alaska needed to decide whether to 
explore, develop and produce non-renewable 
resources (in this case oil) by itself or to let 
private companies do the job on behalf of the 
state. Alaska, with no expertise and no 
equipment for developing oil, decided to let 
private companies explore, develop and 
produce its oil on behalf of the state. The 
privilege of drilling on a particular plot of 
Alaska, with the promise of being the 
subsequent developer was determined on a 
competitive basis, and the right granted to 
the highest bidder (usually a multi-national 
oil company). This is one of three ways that 
the State of Alaska receives revenue from 
ownership of the oil resource. The lease 
bonus payments for the Prudhoe Bay field 
equaled over $900 million in 1969. 
The second way Alaska receives revenue 
is from the fee paid by the developer for 
maintaining rights to a particular lease. This 
is a relatively small fee and usually plays a 
large role only if a company bids and wins in 
a lease sale, pays its lease bonus, and then 
does not drill oil or gas or does not produce 
oil and gas. If the company does not produce 
oil it is not earning any income, yet it still 
pays rent. The state wants to see the resource 
developed and so this is an incentive for the 
company to produce the resource or stop 
paying rent and return the lease. 
Finally, Alaska gets a percentage of the 
resource as the owner. By convention in the 
US for oil this is 1 /8 of the resource ( 12.5%). 
Alaska can take this portion in kind, as 
barrels of oil, or have the oil companies ell 
the oil on the State's behalf. As the 
"sovereign" government, with taxation rights, 
the state levies four taxes. A production 
(severance) tax of 12.5 to 15 percent, a 
conservation tax ( collected lil{e a severance 
tax, but monies are dedicated for 
environmental conservation) of 1 /8 cent per 
barrel of oil, a state corporate income tax on 
profits, and a property tax of 20 mills ( a mill 
is a tax rate equal to .001 percent, in this case, 
the tax rate is .02 percent) on the value of 
property. The State of Alaska further 
devolved some of its powers to local 
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government. For example, in the oil-
producing area the municipal government, 
the North Slope Borough, also levies a 
prope1ty tax at the rate of three mills (.003 
percent). This all adds up to a lot of money. 
The North Slope Borough's tax revenues are 
currently about $200 million for a population 
of almost 10,000 people. The total revenues 
were more than double in the 1980s. 
The North Slope Borough took full 
advantage of their powers for the benefit of 
a primarily Native population. The Borough 
quickly learned that it is of great advantage 
to be a region that global capital markets 
find familiar and tractable, from those that 
seem to the market forbiddingly obscure, 
potentially troublesome or excessively 
expensive. A great part of the North Slope 
Borough's uccess over the last thirty years 
has been the ability to make rating agencies 
and investment bankers, representatives of 
the global capital markets, feel familiar and 
comfortable with the Borough. 
Most people of Alaska, from government 
officials to fishermen, generally accept 
policy conclusions based on a staples theory 
explanation of the relationships between the 
oil producing sector and the rest of the 
economy. They understand that an industry 
is either part of the economic base or the 
support sector. They also understand that 
there is an employment or income 
"multiplier" that takes each dollar created 
by basic industry and sustains and grows 
other sectors of the economy. 
At the same time Alaska incorporated 
public participation in economic rent 
management, policy makers in Alaska 
"discovered" and used the principle of 
comparative advantage. This occurred in 
Alaska during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
when surplus economic rents from the 
petroleum industry equaled several billion 
dollars. By understanding that Alaska's chief 
comparative advantage was in petroleum 
production various proposals were prevented 
from redirecting the immense economic 
rents to develop new untried and ultimately 
unsustainable activities. 
Economists at the University of Alaska 
showed that the value of revenue added to 
the Alaska's economy in the base industry 
(petroleum development) was tremendous, 
relative to any other Alaska activity. For 
example, Alaska would have to produce five 
and a half times US coal production (1979) 
or nine times US copper production (1979) 
to match Alaska's petroleum revenues. The 
people of Alaska were convinced that an 
additional dollar invested on developing an 
additional unit of oil for sale on a 
demonstrated market, or putting the state's 
money in the bank and collecting interest, is 
more efficient han subsidizing a new 
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industry. In short, why should a region 
bother investing and subsidizing 
unsustainable industries when it can make 
more money developing an additional unit 
of base resource or put the money in the 
bank to earn interest? 
This kind of argument led Alaska policy 
makers to create an investment fund from a 
portion of its oil revenue windfall. The Alaska 
Permanent Dividend Fund is a $27 billion 
fund that earns more money than any sector 
of the Alaska economy except the petroleum 
development industry and petroleum support 
industry. Several important features of the 
Permanent Dividend Fund make it 
successful. In particular much of the success 
relates to immunizing the fund from political 
influence and raiding. First, the fund, for the 
time being, is excluded from being used for 
development or investment within the state. 
Although this meant that money from the 
original economic rents would be siphoned 
off outside the state and reduce the multiplier 
effect of the revenue, it diversified the state's 
earnings in investments that gave higher than 
average returns compared to likely returns on 
local development projects. Since most of the 
Alaska economy became depressed as the oil 
economy became depressed (the "bust" 
cycle), the Permanent Dividend Fund was an 
outside fund that provided a diversified and 
stable source of income. 
The second feature of the Permanent 
Dividend Fund removed it from the grasp of 
political raiding, by distributing part of the 
fund's earnings to the people of Alaska. 
Every year a dividend of about $1,000 to 
$2,000 dollars is distributed to every Alaska 
resident. This clever strategy of appealing to 
the residents' rent-seeking behavior insures 
that any politician who would attempt to 
disburse the fund for any reason, including 
general government or special interest 
projects, would be under attack by most 
residents of Alaska. Another advantage to 
the dividend program is that much of the 
money given to the residents is spent within 
Alaska and takes advantage of the multiplier 
effect ( compensation for the fund's "outside" 
investments). The Permanent Dividend 
Fund provides an incentive for citizens to be 
aware and concerned with the general 
management of economic rents. This is also 
an equitable way to let the citizens directly 
enjoy part of the economic rents. 
Alaska's key to becoming wealthy was 
that, armed with all the tools of a US state, 
Alaska was able to capture some of the 
economic rent from the development of oil 
at Prudhoe Bay, redirect the revenue tlow 
and hold it within its own economy. In 
Alaska, although the regional government 
was the resource owner, the actual 
exploration, development and production 
was carried out by private multi-national oil 
companies and private subcontractors to the 
multinational companies. Similarly, 
w 
although some of the benefits of resource 
revenues were squandered by state 
government, overall, much of the benefit of 
the economic rents from petroleum 
development reached the Alaska public, in 
the form of employment, infrastructure, 
services and even a direct disbursement of 
economic rents in the form of a dividend. 
Maintaining the engine 
of growth 
Grave issues face Alaska's future, including 
wasteful use of the revenue tlow from 
economic rent and the sustainability of 
Alaska's petroleum-generated economy, 
once the bulk of the oil is depleted. These 
issues are second order problems. Alaska 
created a successful solution to the 
fundamental problem of a remote or 
peripheral region successfully capturing and 
managing economic rent from non-
renewable resource development o 
maximize the benefits for its inhabitants. 
Maintaining the engine of growth is always 
a problem, as is turning primary resource 
export-led economic growth into diversified 
long term growth. It is un!il{ely that Alaska 
will have a balanced economy any time in 
the near future. Facing this reality involves 
many complicated and unpopular policy 
decisions. Alaska is attempting to break 
trail on a strategy for development in the 
face of diminishing income. Of course the 
secret hope of many Alaskans is that 
another resource boom will come into the 
horizon. The only likely chance of this 
happening is if the natural gas resources of 
the North Slope of Alaska become 
economically viable. 
Indigenous people 
and the economy 
Of course the Beringia region has indigenous 
people who somehow fit within the greater 
economic system. Some arguments about 
development pit the traditional economies of 
indigenous people against the cash economy. 
Discussion of sustainable development often 
creates this dichotomy. For the North, a 
proposition discussed extensively-isthat 
indigenous economic activities are, or can be, 
the foundation of a sustainable livelihood. 
This deserves attention for t\vo reasons. The 
first is that in discussing development in 
Russia the issue of indigenous people's 
participation is particularly relevant. The 
second is that the proposition that the 
indigenous economy must suffer from 
contact, be in conflict or remain exclusive of 
the market, or cash economy, need not be -
true, as we see from the Alaska example. 
Some of the literature that tries to adapt 
sustainability to the North unconsciously 
avoids confronting the inherent ambiguity of 
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economic activity. The discussion is either 
extremely specific (e.g., sustainability of 
northern Canadian indigenous village of Old 
Crow, population 250) or chooses not to 
recognize the diversity in the global 
northern "indigenous economy" and 
addresses only a stereotypical model of 
indigenous economy. But how can the rural 
economy of a region be torn out of the 
general system of the regional economy? 
Most of today's indigenous people, certainly 
in Alaska, and in most of the areas of Russia, 
are very familiar with the cash economy. In 
fact, many of their subsistence activities are 
carried out more efficiently by incorporating 
equipment and supplies from the cash 
economy. This does not diminish the 
importance of indigenous rural subsistence 
to the overall indigenous economy. 
Indigenous people can operate on many 
levels within the world economy and should 
certainly not be condemned for successfully 
adapting and reaping benefits from the 
"Western cash economy." Indigenous peoples 
need not choose between a dichotomy of 
tradition and adaptation to the market. 
Alaska is an example of a region where the 
indigenous economy has synthesized the 
traditional economy and the market. 
The Alaska indigenous economy exists 
within a complex economic, legal, and 
political framework that provides an 
opportunity for the indigenous economy to 
participate in a broad spectrum of economic 
activities, from Native-owned corporations 
to subsistence use of fish and wildlife 
resources. Alaska presents difficult and 
often contradictory evidence for researchers 
addressing sustainability. 
In Alaska the indigenous economy has 
become greatly influenced and involved in 
the oil and gas industry that has dominated 
the Alaska economy. With the discovery of 
the Prudhoe Bay "super" oil field in the late 
1960s, the "indigenous economy" in Alaska 
has become an active participant in the 
market economy of the state. The discove1y 
of oil led to the 1972 Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) that transferred 
12% of the territory of the State of Alaska 
into Native ownership, and, with an award of 
$1 billion, set up 13 regional Native-owned 
corporations and over 200 village Native-
owned corporations. Today, the regional 
ANCSA corporations represent about 75,000 
Alaska Native shareholders (about 15 percent 
of the Alaska population), have close to $3.5 
billion of corporate equity, have annual 
revenue of over $2.5 billion and employ 5% 
of the private workforce in Alaska. 
The indigenous people of Alaska have 
also taken advantage of their rights as state 
and federal citizens. An example of this is the 
organization of the North Slope Borough, 
which has collected over $2 billion in 
property taxes from Prudhoe Bay oil 
development as the local, municipal 
government. The Inupiat controlled North 
Slope Borough government has provided 
high levels of public services, jobs, and 
income over the last twenty years. This 
money has also been used directly to promote 
and support the subsistence conomy in the 
North Slope Borough, by giving the borough 
government the ability to exercise political 
autonomy. A vivid example of this is the fight 
the North Slope Borough mounted against 
the International Whaling Commission's 
(IWC) 1976 ban on traditional bowhead 
whale hunting by Alaska's indigenous people. 
The North Slope Borough was instrumental 
in forming the Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Commission, an indigenous organization that 
formally led the battle for obtaining a quota 
for bowhead whale harvest. The North Slope 
Borough hired scientists and spent more than 
$20 million on an elaborate scientific 
program to demonstrate that bowhead whale 
stocks were double what the IWC had 
incorrectly estimated, thereby reinstating a 
higher quota. 
The indigenous economy is therefore 
more extensive and complex than it is often 
described. Any economic development in the 
North, from resource exploitation projects to 
maintaining services for northern villages, 
requires large investment in infrastructure, 
equipment and organization and is usually 
beyond the means of the village or regional 
capital base. Therefore, state and federal 
government and outside private investment 
are inevitable actors in the economy of the 
North and the indigenous economy. The 
indigenous peoples in northern economies, in 
turn, are part of the global economy. 
So what does this all mean for the 
Russian economy of Beringia? 
Chukotka 
Chukotka is virtually lacking in basic 
industry, in the sense the term is used in 
regional economic analysis. This situation is 
the combined effect of a near-termination of 
the Cold War military presence, near-
collapse of mining enterprises that turned 
out to be uneconomic in the face of global 
costs and commodity prices, and sharp 
contraction of the subsidies to general 
government and public services formerly 
provided by Moscow. 
A change in administration has brought 
great changes to the region relative to 
regional economic conditions from 1990 to 
2000. Governor Abramovich and his 
administration have arranged for federal 
transfers to actually be spent within 
Chukotka and also attracted considerable 
private investment and humanitarian aid. 
Nevertheless, the only current viable base 
industry is gold mining. This industry 
produces a small percentage of what it did 
twenty years ago, however, investment is 
being made into this sector. The new 
Governor has also attracted a major Russian 
oil company to explore the oil and gas 
potential of the region. This is the last great 
hope for a new base industry. At this point 
the level of discovered resources are limited 
and are for local use. For example, in Anadyr, 
the region's capital, the main power plant is 
being switched over from coal to natural gas. 
In this situation agriculture and 
subsistence activities remain 
disproportionately important o the local 
population. Until recently, the local people 
in Chukotka have been excluded from 
mining and related high-wage occupations 
( engineering, construction, truck-driving 
and the like), making up a small percentage 
of the ordinary labor force. Most indigenous 
people were kept in the agricultural sector 
through the collective-and state-farm 
systems, but a few were trained as 
government and communist party 
administrators or educated as scientists, 
teachers, artists, musicians and doctors. 
Today, the agricultural sector remains 
one of the most important industries for the 
indigenous populations, but it also faces a 
steady contraction. Most of Chukotka's non-
military labor force is ( or was, until 
chronically unemployed) engaged in mining, 
and has been made up almost exclusively of 
migrants from other parts of the Soviet 
Union. Accelerated movement of Native 
people from the agricultural sector to urban 
wage labor ( or urban unemployment) will 
probably result in few overall benefits to the 
indigenous people or the region. 
In Chukotka, the traditional sector is 
important to several indigenous groups of 
rural people-particularly the Native 
reindeer and marine-mammal hunters. These 
are populations of people in Chukotka who 
cannot easily leave the rural areas, even in 
the worst economic risis. Most of the 
Russian and Ukrainian population still 
retain strong links to other parts of Russia 
and the former Soviet Union and could 
adapt to the job market by moving to 
another pa1t of the country. Many of the 
indigenous people would find moving to any 
other part of Russia difficult. Even moving 
from the rural to urban areas involves 
significant change for people raised in a rural 
lifestyle. 
This brings us back to the original 
question. Can the mod~rnization experience 
in Alaska be useful to set an economic 
roadmap for Chukotka? The first step is to 
establish a generally accepted framework of 
economic and policy analysis for Alaska or 
the US Arctic. We have made significant 
strides toward defining this framework. One 
thing is clear, there is still a lot of work for 
social scientists to do. 
Arion TUSSING 
and John TICHOTSKY, 
economic and policy analysts 
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